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Protective orders are commonplace in civil litigation, with 
trade secrets, privileged communications, and the like protected from 
public disclosure. In most cases, the protective orders are 
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individualized and discrete, with each document evaluated 
separately. 
In mass torts, protective orders are a different beast. When 
litigants (mostly defendants) are producing large numbers of 
documents, they typically agree to a blanket protective order in 
advance, with the confidentiality of documents being designated by 
the producing party without document-by-document evaluation by 
the court. Such orders ordinarily permit the challenge of the 
confidentiality designations, but those challenges are relatively rare. 
In such cases, then, the confidentiality of the documents during the 
discovery process is largely within the control of the producing 
party. If the cases reach trial, very few if any documents used at trial 
are kept within the protective order, as the presumption for public 
access shifts to being very strong at that stage. 
The parties agree to such orders for two primary reasons. 
First, it is a practical way to deal with the sheer volume of exhibits 
and the fact that many of the documents are legitimately secret-
manufacturing techniques, for instance, in pharmaceutical cases. 
Second, maintaining defendants' "bad documents" in secrecy 
provides leverage for plaintiffs in negotiating settlements short of 
trial, since settlement will theoretically prevent the documents from 
becoming public. Similarly, leaked documents can be used to create 
embarrassment and concomitant pressure on defendants (especially 
those that are publicly traded) to settle cases or to generate media 
attention that will recruit additional potential clients. 
Many papers address the question of the appropriate use of 
protective orders dealing with the issues described above. The 
scholarship focuses on the proper balance for the tort system to strike 
between its role as a means for resolving disputes and its potential 
role as a means for obtaining information about the conduct of the 
parties, especially as that conduct affects public health.' 
This Article is not a fundamental challenge to the approach 
discussed and suggested by those papers. Instead, I address that 
scholarship initially to establish a foundational point: Most protective 
orders in mass torts have been appropriate, and most documents 
presently designated as confidential have been properly designated, 
at least under the policies that have been established to date. Put 
another way, I start with the notion that protective orders have value 
1. See infra Part I. 
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and that there are reasons to try to prevent their regular and notorious 
violation. At the same time, I recognize that the orders have been 
abused occasionally and perhaps even regularly. On that foundation, 
I explore trends in protective order practice, focusing on the changes 
effected by the rise of electronic communications, and addressing 
two impacts in particular. 
First, as set forth below, Internet and other new technologies 
have dramatically increased the volume of documents to be produced 
by parties in litigation, in turn increasing the costs and efforts 
expended in the document designation process. Those increased 
costs may result in a stronger probability of erroneous designation of 
documents as confidential, whether intentionally erroneous or not. 
A second, and likely more important, impact of electronic 
communications is what happens when documents are disclosed 
contrary to the protective order-intentionally or not. As recently as 
a decade ago, parties and courts might have realistically hoped to 
recover leaked confidential documents that were disclosed in 
violation of a protective order without those documents becoming 
generally available. Today, in any case that has attracted public 
attention, the odds of such recovery are vanishingly small. As the
2 
Article's title suggests, the bell can simply not be unrung.
These changes suggest that a reevaluation of protective 
orders may be appropriate, and a change in courts' approaches to 
protective order violations-whether in improper designation or 
improper disclosure-may be appropriate as well. Because of the 
reality changes outlined above, the balance struck may need to be 
changed. Historically, violations of protective orders have been a 
relatively low priority for the courts; the people involved receive 
minor or no sanctions for their actions. Because the stakes are now 
higher, I argue, the courts should be more open to serious 
punishments for violations of protective orders (of any sort), and 
should be more precise in laying out the orders in the first place. In 
short, the courts should be much more focused on preventing leaks 
before they occur, through deterrence and more precise protective 
2. Tom Zeller Jr., Documents Borne by Winds of Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 15, 2007, at C3 (quoting William G. Childs, Judge Tries to Unring Bell 
HangingAround Neck of Horse Already Out ofBarn Being Carriedon Ship That 
Has Sailed, TORTSPROF BLOG, Dec. 20, 2006, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
tortsprof/2006/12/j udge-triesjto.htm). 
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orders, rather than remediation afterwards, which is almost entirely 
pointless to even attempt. 
I proceed in three Parts. In Part I, I briefly provide an 
overview of the development of protective orders, particularly in 
mass torts. In this Part, I describe the overall state of scholarship and 
litigation relating to protective orders, in particular the balance 
various writers have proposed between the parties' legitimate 
privacy and confidentiality interests versus the public interest in 
information-spreading. I also describe some leaks in past cases. 
In Part II, I explore in some detail a recent case, the Zyprexa 
litigation, that exemplifies most of the document disclosure issues 
through a modem lens. This case, I argue, may suggest the future of 
protective order violations, and should therefore be considered 
carefully. 3 In that case, a paid plaintiffs' expert, a lawyer not 
involved in the principal litigation, and a reporter from the New York 
Times worked together in what a federal judge described as a 
"conspiracy" to publicize documents previously under seal.4 In this 
Part, I will describe the events in some detail, addressing the 
potential overdesignation of documents by the defendant as well as 
the process through which those documents became readily 
available, even as the judge sought their return. As will become 
clear, the use of anonymizing technologies-and the fundamental 
ease of distributing documents electronically-made that effort 
fruitless. 
Finally, in Part III, I provide some suggestions for how 
litigants and courts should change the way they act to deal with the 
new world in which they are acting. To date, most protective orders 
still look in the main as they did twenty or thirty years ago, and 
efforts to enforce them are similarly static. Here, I suggest that 
today's world mandates a shift in approach, and that business as 
usual is no longer a reasonable option for a number of reasons. I 
then urge greater penalties for violations of protective orders on any 
side, including the possibility of holding attorneys directly 
responsible in limited circumstances for the actions of their clients or 
3. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), is only 
an example, and I note other recent protective order violations as well. That said, 
the Zyprexa Injunction case is the best documented and best represents the 
phenomena I am focusing on, and so it receives, by far, the most detailed 
discussion. 
4. Id. at 395. 
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retained experts. I also suggest that protective orders should be more 
readily subject to challenge by third parties. Finally, I argue that 
protective orders should be more comprehensive and specific. 
I. HISTORY 
What happens in court is presumptively public. 5 Once a 
document or an excerpt of testimony is "used in the proceeding," 6 a 
presumption of access attaches. A tremendous number of documents 
and many hours of testimony are, however, never used in an action, 
whether a mass tort or otherwise. As to those documents, the right 
of access, if it exists at all, is much less clear. 7 And it is as to those 
documents that the protective orders discussed in this Article apply. 
Protective orders-particularly in mass torts-are designed to 
facilitate the discovery and litigation process while protecting the 
parties. 8 Federal courts have the authority to issue protective orders 
under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Typically, 
such orders are sought as to a particular document or set of 
documents, or to the contents of a particular deposition.9 In mass 
torts, however, it is common for parties to agree to prospective 
protective orders, permitting the producing party to designate 
documents as subject to the protective order without the court ruling 
on them individually. 0 
5. E.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 
J.L. & POL'Y 53, 53 (2000) ("The assumption that all aspects of court-centered 
litigation are out in the open, on the record, and fully explained by the court is an 
important foundation for the confidence our public has in its courts."). 
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Rule 5(d), amended in 2001, directs courts to refuse 
filing discovery materials until "used in the action." Once so filed, they are much 
more likely to be deemed public. Without being filed, it is difficult for the public 
to access them. See generally Weinstein, supra note 5, at 56-58 (describing the 
common practice of secrecy agreements in case settlements). 
7. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2042, at 544-46 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that 
Rule 26(c)(6) gives courts the ability to order that depositions and answers to 
interrogatories be kept sealed). 
8. See id. § 2035 (stating that Rule 26(c) offers protection to parties and 
witnesses during discovery). 
9. Id. § 2043. 
10. Id. § 2035, at 476-77; Anita Hotchkiss & Diane M. Fleming, Protecting 
and EnforcingProtective Orders:EasierSaid Than Done, 71 DEF. COUNS. J.161, 
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The reasons are, presumably, obvious: the number of claims 
is not the only thing that is massive about mass torts. When the 
subject matter of a suit is a pharmaceutical product, a medical 
device, or a consumer product, the defendant has likely created, at a 
minimum, hundreds of thousands, and more likely millions or even 
tens of millions, of pages of documents arguably responsive to 
discovery requests.]' It is no great surprise that many documents are 
asserted to be under a protective order, given the broad subject 
matter routinely alleged to constitute trade secrets-ranging from-
manufacturing processes to privileged communications to marketing 
strategies. 
The advantages of protective orders should not be 
overlooked. As Arthur Miller notes, "Litigants do not give up their 
privacy rights simply because they have walked, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, through the courthouse door." 12  Unfettered distri­
bution of otherwise private materials has its own harm (even if the 
information has no independent value) increased, as he again notes,
"when the information is disclosed to the media, competitors, 
political adversaries, and even curious members of the public."' 
3 
The more obvious reason for the use of protective orders is, 
of course, to protect the litigants' property rights. Again quoting 
Miller: 
In today's business world, commercial information 
often has a value that is tangible enough to be bought 
and sold for huge sums of money, and extraordinary 
efforts are expended to control it and to maintain its 
security and confidentiality. It is not surprising, then, 
that our legal system considers information to be 
14 
property. 
161 (2004) (discussing the potential for protective orders to exclude confidential 
information). Though the Hotchkiss article is introduced with an assertion that 
"[the] harsh truth is that the era of broad, agreed-upon protective orders covering 
virtually every document is gone," id., such orders remain common at least in mass 
tort litigation, for reasons described in the text. 
11. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 53-54 (referring to the changes wrought 
in data collection by Internet and e-mail technologies). 
12. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,ProtectiveOrders,and PublicAccess to 
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 466 (1991). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 467-68. 
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Such information can range from the classic trade secret (e.g., 
the formula for Coke 15) to perhaps the less obvious but still-
protected marketing plans, market share data, and the like. It can, 
further, include information that may also be relevant to public 
safety questions: company scientists speculating about how a 
comparative safety test might end up, internal analyses of adverse 
event reports, and so on. 16 
Perhaps more problematically, there are other reasons for the 
extensive use of protective orders in mass tort cases, and for 
plaintiffs sometimes not pushing as hard for disclosure as one might 
expect. As has been described by others, the possibility of keeping 
documents secret-both "bad documents" and marginally 
confidential but valuable documents-no doubt can affect the ability 
of plaintiffs to settle cases and the amount for which cases will 
settle. 17 Put more bluntly, defendants will pay more to keep bad 
documents secret. As most commentators observing this practice 
note, to the extent the litigation system's public nature is important 
for public health purposes, the practice of "buying secrecy" is, at a 
minimum, worth careful consideration.' 
8 
15. Miller, indeed, discusses a labor dispute involving Coca-Cola, where, 
even with a stringent protective order, the company apparently chose to settle the 
case rather than disclose the formula. Id. at 469-70. 
16. To emphasize, the fact that such information is potentially worthy of 
protection does not mean that it is, or that I think it should be, protected in all 
cases. 
17. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: 
PostmarketingSurveillance, Compensation, and the Role ofLitigation, 5 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 587, 665 (2005) ("Plaintiffs may accede to such 
secrecy provisions in return for a higher settlement payment."); Jack B. Weinstein, 
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 512 (1994) 
("Plaintiffs' attorneys' threats to reveal ['smoking gun' documents] can be a 
powerful lever for higher settlements."); Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine 
Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 20 (2001) 
("[D]efendant will agree to a settlement in a completely meritless case because the 
jurisdiction is pro-plaintiff.., but the defendant may not wish to provide a basis 
for national settlement before more neutral judges and juries."); Miller, supranote 
12, at 473 ("In the most extreme cases, plaintiffs seek an order compelling 
disclosure of commercially valuable data as a 'bludgeon' to force a favorable 
settlement."). 
18. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 53 ("Any sacrifice of confidence by 
shuttering off part of the sunshine through secrecy orders needs careful 
consideration and justification."); Struve, supra note 17, at 665 ("Commentators 
have raised concerns that secrecy provisions may prevent the disclosure to the 
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That practice is obviously limited in large part to cases where 
the defendant intends not to try any cases, i.e., where the parties 
agree to settle or otherwise dispose of all cases outside of the 
FDA of information concerning product safety."). Of course how problematic one 
finds this practice depends on how one prioritizes the goals of litigation. If the 
sole goal is the resolution of conflicts, this practice is largely reasonable. 
However, as Struve argues, the tort system is an important part of the public health 
system, and this secrecy makes unavailable potentially important sources of data. 
Struve, supra note 17, at 665-66. As previously noted, this Article does not focus 
on that important discussion. 
It is worth observing tangentially that often the purported "smoking gun" 
documents released are in fact either less compelling than represented or at most 
only part of the story. In the documents released by Dr. Egilman in the Zyprexa 
Injunction case, for instance, the documents can be generally categorized as 
relating to potential off-label marketing of the drug and as relating to side effects, 
including diabetes. The documents relating to off-label marketing are certainly of 
interest, though they are largely only suggestive of an interest in such marketing 
rather than evidence that Lilly in fact engaged in it. It is not generally unlawful for 
a company to track off-label use (just as it is not unlawful for a doctor to prescribe 
a medicine off-label); nor is it unlawful to hope for such use. Indeed, certain 
actions that may encourage off-label use are permitted. And, of course, the off-
label marketing documents are, in most cases, not directly relevant to most of the 
personal injury suits, though they are of tremendous interest to state and third-
party payor litigants. 
The documents relating to the safety of the medicine are facially more 
concerning, but in those documents, again, there is less than meets the eye. A 
majority of the documents relate to analyses of spontaneous adverse event 
reports-reports that are made voluntarily by anyone who wishes to make them. 
Companies are encouraged to track and analyze the reports carefully, but 
epidemiologists warn against relying on them to establish rates, especially 
comparative rates, of side effects, due to many confounders in the evidence. I 
address the actual materiality of the leaked documents in more detail infra. 
An additional factor is the difficulty of using this strategy, either by plaintiffs 
or defendants. Once a matter comes to open court, of course, there is a strong 
presumption of public access. See Miller, supra note 12, at 429 (discussing the 
historical roots of the right of access and the modem movement towards public 
access of information). In modem mass torts, at least one case almost always goes 
to trial, and thus at least some key documents become public. That said, in the 
primary case discussed below, the Zyprexa litigation, there has not yet been a trial, 
and in cases where there are trials, the leak of documents can have its own 
pernicious effects as discussed in the text. 
Finally, a pragmatic note: some practicing mass tort lawyers who have 
reviewed this Article suggest that once a case actually gets to trial, plaintiffs' 
lawyers are not really focusing on getting the bad documents into the public 
domain. That is, of course, true, and some number of documents will not in fact be 
introduced into evidence in any given trial. But enough will to make it worth 
something to avoid a trial and their release. 
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courtroom. This is because at least some number of the critical 
documents will become public at any trial that takes place, and so it 
makes little sense to pay a premium to avoid the release of 
documents that will become public anyway. But leverage for greater 
settlements is not the only potential way that the abuse of protective 
orders can be used to create undue pressure. Selective leaking of 
documents to the media can create additional pressure (particularly 
for publicly-traded companies) to settle cases rather than face the 
possibility of a trial. In one case, the lawyer trying the first of many 
cases acknowledged that he was doing just that: "'I was feeding a lot 
of information to European and U.S. papers,' [Mikal Watts] says. 'It 
was part of my strategy to affect the stock price, which I was very 
successful at."'19 
Many judges, lawyers, and scholars have addressed the 
potential advantages and drawbacks to secrecy in litigation. In what 
19. Monica Langley, Courtroom Triage: Bayer, Pressedto Settle a Flood of 
Suits Over Drug, Fights Back, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A I. The main 
coverage I am aware of was in the New York Times, with an article coauthored by 
Alex Berenson, who became a central player (and, according to Judge Weinstein, a 
conspirator) in the Zyprexa Injunction case discussed below. Melody Petersen & 
Alex Berenson, PapersIndicate That Bayer Knew Of Dangersof Its Cholesterol 
Drug,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 2003, at A5. That story cites documents made public 
by plaintiffs' attorneys but does not make clear whether they were still under the 
protective order. Id. Many of them, given the timeline, had perhaps been used in 
open court in summary judgment briefing. Thus, it is not certain whether they 
were in fact leaked or simply released-but the strategy reflected is the same in 
any event, with documents being used outside of a situation where they can be 
contextualized. As noted supra, I represented Bayer in the Baycol litigation. 
In one sense, the Zyprexa Injunction case is atypical. The documents were 
leaked even though the defendant is settling (at least to date) every case, and thus, 
one could assume, paying a premium for ongoing secrecy. That would suggest 
that the plaintiffs do not, in fact, have an incentive to leak the documents, and 
indeed should oppose such leaks-and in fact, as noted below, the MDL steering 
committee joined in the defendants' efforts to retrieve the documents. (It is 
possible, however, that the enormous press given to the leaked documents could 
create new potential clients, thus benefiting the plaintiffs' counsel.) 
In addition to the examples provided in the text of people interested in sealing 
or revealing documents in litigation, other players include business competitors; 
other plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to enter the litigation; already-involved 
plaintiffs' attorneys seeking additional clients through receiving press; third-party 
litigants (i.e., shareholders, attorneys general, third-party payors, and the like); 
non-profit entities like Mr. Gottstein's; regulators; researchers; judges; academics; 
and so on. I thank Judge Weinstein for suggesting these additional members of the 
typology of interested parties. 
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is a useful summary of most of the arguments before and since, 
Arthur Miller wrote, in 1991, of attacks on protective orders that 
arose subsequent to various court challenges to the orders, in 
particular Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.20  Miller wrote that the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (now the American 
Association for Justice ("AAJ")) was then "press[ing] for legislation 
prohibiting courts from entering orders that would have the effect of 
'concealing public hazards' and had "sought a presumptive right of 
access to all information produced in litigation, including everything 
exchanged in discovery but not used at trial, as well as the contents 
of settlement agreements." 
2' 
Miller evaluated the benefits of major changes in protective 
order practice (efficiency, public health) along with the downsides 
(complicating discovery, increased demands on judicial resources). 22 
Finding the alleged harms caused by secrecy to be largely overstated 
and the benefits of the system as it stood to be significant, he 
ultimately concluded that major changes were not appropriate in 
1991, and indeed major changes have not taken place in the ensuing
23 
sixteen-plus years.
Others have addressed the same questions and come out in a 
variety of ways. Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Chief Judge of the 
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, made 
his views clear in the title of a symposium essay, "Hidden from the 
Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-
Enforced Secrecy.",24 His essay focuses largely on the related but 
different question of sealed settlements and closed courtrooms (as 
did the symposium in which it was published), but it also addresses 
20. Miller, supra note 12; Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 
(1984). 
21. Miller, supranote 12, at 442. 
22. Id. at 477-89. 
23. Id. at 502. Laurie Dor&in 1999 provided another extensive and thorough 
exploration of the competing interests in stipulated protective orders. Laurie 
Kratky Dor6, Secrecy By Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the 
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 324-71 (1999). She 
concluded that stipulated protective orders "serve valuable public, as well as 
private, interests." Id. at 370. She notes, however, that courts should remain 
cognizant of their duty to supervise discovery and that "[i]n some instances, 
broader public interests may well override the litigants' mutual desire for secrecy." 
Id. at 371. 
24. Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hiddenfrom the Public by Order of the Court: 
The CaseAgainst Government-EnforcedSecrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711 (2004). 
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secrecy in connection with discovery materials-though only in the 
context of the materials being used in the action, either in connection 
with trial or a motion. 25 As he points out, significant changes have 
taken place in the form of "sunshine provisions"-provisions that 
create (in typical examples) a presumption of access to court 
records. 26 But those provisions do not, with few, if any exceptions, 
change the practice in connection with protective orders-because 
(in federal court and some state courts) discovery materials are not 
court records. 
Of particular interest (not least because he is the judge 
overseeing the Zyprexa multi-district litigation discussed below) are 
the views of Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New 
York. As early as 1994, Judge Weinstein wrote of secrecy 
agreements in his seminal Individual Justice in Mass Tort 
Litigation.27 He succinctly summarized the interests involved: 
The most common form of secrecy utilized by the 
defendant in a mass tort case is the protective order. 
[Rule 26(c)] permits... a protective order ... upon a 
showing of "good cause." This provision does not 
specifically refer to the public interest. Rather, it 
applies primarily to commercially sensitive in­
formation that might cause the defendant some 
competitive harm. Defendants want to avoid dis­
closure of damaging information. Plaintiffs desire to 
use this damaging information as a negotiation tool 
for larger settlements for clients in the future. 
"Smoking gun" documents are the most 
damaging form of this information. They indicate 
defendants knew of the danger but suppressed the 
information.28 
25. Id. at 719-20 ("Although these [stipulated protective] orders often 
provide for 'blanket' confidentiality of all documents produced, no public interest 
is implicated because discovery is not filed with the court until it is necessary to do 
so in connection with a motion or a trial."). 
26. See id. at 725-26 & n.40 (cataloging "sunshine provisions"). 
27. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 
(1995). A shorter version of much of the book was published in Weinstein, supra 
note 17. 
28. WEINSTEIN, supranote 27, at 67 (citations omitted). 
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Judge Weinstein further acknowledged the point, most often 
made by defendants, that these supposed "smoking guns" sometimes 
are "shown to be neutral or even favorable to the defendant," but that 
providing the necessary context is difficult and time-consuming. 
29 
After discussing the various interests, Judge Weinstein concluded: 
Protective orders may have a legitimate role when 
there is no public impact or when true trade secrets 
are involved. But we can strike a fairer balance 
between privacy interests of corporations and the 
health and safety of the public. A publicly maintained 
legal system ought not protect those who engage in 
misconduct, conceal the cause of injury from the 
victims, or render potential victims vulnerable. 
Moreover, such secrecy defeats the deterrent function 
of the justice system.30 
After noting the fact that judges might be too inclined to 
approve secrecy agreements (due to a desire to clear calendars), he 
argues for a national approach that would be less biased in favor of 
granting broad protective orders.3 
Judge Weinstein returned to the issue in an essay in 2000, 
noting that changes were taking place due to "the enormous increase 
in data collected and available through computers, the ease of 
widespread transmission via the internet and e-mail," and other 
technological phenomena. 32 In discussing protective orders, he 
repeated verbatim much of the description above, and noted his 
practice of approving sealing orders only with the addition that it 
could be judicially modified if necessary for the "public interest." 
33 
As earlier, he argues for a balancing test, "weighing the interests of 
the parties in keeping the information confidential against the 
interests of the public in publishing it." 34 His default view is clearly 
in favor of disclosure: "Each case is different, but, in general, where 
there is a doubt, secrecy should be rejected. Any secrecy agreement 
29. Id. at 68. 
30. Id. at 70 (citations omitted). 
31. Id. at 71. 
32. Weinstein, supranote 5, at 54. 
33. Id. at 61. 
34. Id. at 58. 
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should have a judicial imprimatur, with the discretion in the court to 
modify the agreement on application of a party to the litigation or of 
a third party."
' 35 
A year later, Judge Weinstein returned to the topic in an 
article co-authored with his law clerk.36 He again repeated verbatim 
much of the same introductory material, but expanded his views as to 
mass tort litigation in particular: 
Because mass tort cases are similar in some respects 
to institutional reform through legislation or private 
attorney general litigation in their impact on society, 
the interests of individual members of the community 
must sometimes give way to the interests of the 
community as a whole. Judges must consider the 
need for a broad-based public inquiry in mass tort 
cases, especially since government regulatory systems 
designed to protect the public are often inadequate. 
They must weigh the potential interests of litigants in 
other lawsuits, the needs of regulatory agencies to 
have access to information, the interests of future 
plaintiffs, and the concerns of public interest groups, 
which includes the concerns of the scientific
37 
community, for openness. 
Even with this more explicit concern about secrecy in mass torts, 
Judge Weinstein concludes with his same recommendation-that 
judges note that protective orders can be modified when in the public 
interest, along with some encouragement for third-party intervention 
in protective order disputes. 
38 
This much is not new. The document productions in mass 
tort litigation have been sufficiently large to justify umbrella 
protective orders for years, and some numbers of documents have 
been leaked from time to time for the same period. And, of course, 
scholars, lawyers, judges, and others have argued that protective 
orders fail to strike the proper balance as to the public interest, and 
35. Id.at 65. 
36. Weinstein & Wimberly, supra note 17. 
37. Id. at 21-22 (footnotes omitted). 
38. Id. at 18-24. 
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 27:4 
have urged changes in the law, but the applicable law has not 
changed appreciably. 
What is new is what happens after those leaks. To see how 
that has changed, we turn to Zyprexa. 
II. THE ZYPREXA CASE 
Zyprexa (the brand name for olanzapine) is what is known as 
an atypical antipsychotic medication. It was approved in 1996 and is 
marketed by Eli Lilly & Company ("Lilly"), for which it, at this 
writing, represents, by a substantial margin, its most successful 
product in terms of annual sales. 39  It is approved in the United 
States for the treatment of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and 
agitation associated with both of those ailments.4 ° 
At least 30,000 personal injury lawsuits have been filed 
against Lilly relating to alleged injuries claimed to be caused by 
Zyprexa. 41 Though the allegations vary, the core claims asserted by 
plaintiffs relate to obesity, weight gain, and diabetes (and insufficient 
warnings thereof). 42  Plaintiffs (including third-party payors) also 
allege that Lilly improperly marketed Zyprexa "off-label" (i.e., for 
indications for which it is not approved) as a treatment for dementia 
and related symptoms. 43 No cases have gone to trial. As of its 2006 
39. ELI LILLY & Co., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, NOTICE OF 2007 ANNUAL 
MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 12 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT], 
available athttp://www.lilly.com/investor/annual-report/lillyar2006.pdf. 
40. PACKAGE INSERT FOR OLANZAPINE 4-7 (2007), available at 
http://pi.lilly.com/us/zyprexa-pi.pdf 
41. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
42. Id. 
43. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1956, 05-CV-4115, 
05-CV-2948, slip op. at 2-3. (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007) (order denying summary 
judgment), available at http://psychrights.org/states/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/ 
zyprexa-order-6-28-07.pdf. Indeed, some of the state investigations and suits have 
followed the New York Times stories that were based on the leaked documents 
discussed infra. See Alex Berenson, Lilly Considers $1 Billion Fine to Settle 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2008, at Al (reporting on possible $1 billion 
settlement with state and federal governments for violating laws governing how 
drugs can be promoted); Alex Berenson, Drug Files Show Maker Promoted 
Unapproved Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at Al, (reporting, based on leaked 
documents, that Lilly promoted Zyprexa as a treatment for conditions other than 
bipolar disorder or schizophrenia). The off-label marketing claims do not 
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Annual Report, Lilly has instead settled the substantial majority of 
the Zyprexa cases, with charges of over $1.5 billion.44 Additional 
settlements have been announced since then.45 
Millions of pages of documents have been F6roduced by Lilly 
to the plaintiffs, in both federal and state cases. A presumably 
smaller number of pages-largely medical records-have been 
produced by the plaintiffs.47 Many of those pages are stamped under 
the Protective Order, "Confidential-Subject to Protective Order., 
48 
Thousands of pages of documents so stamped ended up in the 
hands of reporters and activists, available within minutes to anyone 
who wanted to find them, in what the trial judge concluded was a 
violation of the protective order.49 Those documents remain readily 
available online, as discussed below, despite the judge's conclusion 
that the documents were improperly leaked and the injunction of a 
number of people who had been distributing them.50 
The Zyprexa experience provides a useful example of the 
modem state of play in mass torts and protective orders, and it is 
therefore worth describing in detail. 
A. The ProtectiveOrder 
The "Protective Order" referenced is an August 9, 2004, 
order issued by Judge Weinstein, also referred to as "Case 
Management Order No. 3.,,51 That Order was issued, by its terms, to 
necessarily relate to the injury claims, except for plaintiffs who can allege that they 
should not have received Zyprexa at all and that the product caused harm. 
44. See 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 11 (reporting $1.07 billion 
of pre-tax settlement in second quarter 2005 and $500 million in fourth quarter 
report). 
45. Alex Berenson, Lilly Settles With 18,000 Over Zyprexa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
7, 2007, at C1. 
46. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (noting that "millions of 
documents" were obtained by plaintiffs' counsel under discovery order requiring 
records be sealed on consent of the parties). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 422-23. 
50. See infra Part II.C. 
51. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1596, 2004 WL 3520247, at 
* 1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2004) (protective order). Judge Weinstein is the judge 
supervising the Multi-District Litigation; all federal cases brought relating to 
Zyprexa have been transferred to him for pre-trial discovery purposes. 
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"expedite the flow of discovery material, facilitate the prompt 
resolution of disputes over confidentiality, adequately protect 
confidential material, and ensure that protection is afforded only to 
material so entitled., 52 The Order provides that the producing party 
can designate any document as confidential if that party "in good 
faith believes [the document] is properly protected under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7).,, 53 "Confidential" documents can 
be disclosed to various people employed by involved law firms, 
court officials, experts, and similar people who have signed an 
"Endorsement of Protective Order," which commits the party to 
maintain the documents' confidentiality under the terms of the 
Protective Order and subjects the signor to the court's jurisdiction.54 
The Order also provides that a party or intervenor can dispute the 
confidentiality of documents, with the designating party required to 
respond within twenty days of notification; if the parties cannot 
resolve the dispute amicably, the designating party is to file a motion 
for a protective order within forty-five days, or longer if so agreed by 
the parties.55 Finally, and importantly for the dispute in this case, the 
Protective Order provides for a procedure to follow if designated 
documents are subpoenaed by courts or agencies. 
56 The person who 
receives the subpoena is required to notify the designating party of 
the details of the subpoena; "In no event shall confidential 
documents be produced prior to the receipt of written notice by the 
designating party and a reasonable opportunity to object.",
5 7 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at *2-3. 
55. Id. at *5. This provision, as discussed infra, became one basis for 
claiming that previously confidential documents had become public. 
56. Id. at *6. 
57. Id. Mr. Gottstein has pointed out to me via an e-mail that a 2004 draft of 
the Protective Order provided for a ten-day period after notice to the designating 
party, after which production would be permitted. E-mail from James Gottstein to 
author (May 23, 2007) (on file with author) (citing Letter from Christopher Seeger 
to Magistrate Judge A. Simon Chrein at 17, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
04-MD-1596 (E.D.N.Y Jul. 16, 2004)). This timeline was changed to require
"prompt" notice to the designating party and to preclude production until after a 
"reasonable opportunity" to object. In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 
1596, 2004 WL 3520247, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. August 9, 2004). 
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B. Obtainingthe Documents 
In late 2006, however, while the litigation seemed to be 
settling down, the New York Times published a series of articles 
based on thousands of pages of documents it had received from an 
Alaska lawyer, James Gottstein.58 Gottstein was not involved in the 
tort litigation; he works against alleged forced medications of 
mentally ill patients in that state. The documents he obtained, as 
described below, were from the production in the tort litigation and 
were (for the most part) designated as confidential under the 
Protective Order. In addition to the New York Times reporter (Alex 
Berenson), Gottstein distributed the documents electronically to 
roughly eighteen other people or organizations, some of whom 
posted the documents online. 59 From those posts, many copies of 
the documents were distributed by means of various technologies 
that provide anonymity. Indeed, less than a month after the articles 
ran in the Times, and after efforts by the court to enjoin distribution, 
I was able to find the documents within nineteen minutes. 
60 
In this sub-Part, I lay out the means by which the documents 
were obtained in some detail. The detail is necessary to explore the 
range of parties who might have an interest in avoiding or defeating 
a protective order in today's society, as discussed further below. 
Dr. David Egilman, who is at the center of the Zyprexa 
document leak, is an occupational health specialist and regular 
plaintiffs' expert witness. 61 The Lanier Law Firm, a high-profile 
plaintiffs' law firm, hired Egilman in August 2006 to serve as an 
expert. 62 Not long after, the Lanier firm sent Egilman the Protective 
Order, asking him to sign the attached Endorsement. 
63 
58. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
59. The breadth of the document distribution online is discussed in more 
detail in Part II.C. infra. 
60. William G. Childs, ProtectiveOrdersand the Internet,TORTSPROF BLOG, 
Jan. 8, 2007, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2007/0 1/protective 
_orde.html. I looked again in early July 2007 and found the documents within a 
similar period of time. The details of the documents' distribution are discussed 
infra Part II.C. 
61. He has been identified in cases in which I have been involved as defense 
counsel, though I have had no interactions with him and have no involvement in 
the Zyprexa litigation. 
62. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 399. 
63. Id. 
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Egilman initially performed a number of edits to the 
Endorsement, crossing out the sentence that acknowledged that his 
execution of the Endorsement was a requirement to receive access to 
the confidential documents and adding a statement that would permit 
his release of confidential documents if "needed to protect public 
health.",64 An attorney at the Lanier firm "conveyed the seriousness" 
of the Protective Order and told Egilman that the Endorsement was 
required to be signed if Egilman wished to receive access to the 
confidential documents. 
65 
Thereafter, on November 14, 2006, Egilman signed an 
Endorsement with only one change, adding "other sworn statements" 
as a basis for disclosure. 66 Egilman explained to the Lanier attorney 
that he wanted to be able to cooperate with either the FDA or 
Congress if subpoenaed.67 With those changes, which left the 
fundamental strictures of the Protective Order in place, he then 
received access to the full database of documents produced by
68 
Lilly. 
Just two weeks later, Egilman contacted James Gottstein, an 
attorney in Alaska.69 Gottstein is the founder of The Law Project for 
Psychiatric Rights, also known as PsychRights. PsychRights is a 
non-profit whose mission is "to undertake a coordinated, strategic, 
legal effort seeking to end the abuses against people diagnosed with 
mental illness through individual legal representation." Gottstein 
does not represent clients in products liability suits and had no prior 
direct connection to the Zyprexa litigation. His organization's 
64. Id. at 399. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 400. 
67. Id. It is worth noting that Dr. Egilman himself has asserted the right 
against self-incrimination and refused to testify as to these matters, id. at 406, and 
so citations are to the testimony and affidavits of others. Similarly, Alex Berenson 
of the New York Times declined Judge Weinstein's "invitation" to voluntarily 
testify about his role in the production and distribution of the documents. Id. at 
411-12. My interpretation of the facts of what occurred generally tracks that of 
Judge Weinstein, and as a whole, the facts are not in dispute among the parties. 
68. Egilman later said that he sent Mr. Gottstein all of the documents within 
his possession. As discussed infra, he did not state whether he had previously had 
more documents or had access to more documents. 
69. Id. at 400. 
70. Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, About the Law Project for Psychiatric 
Rights (Mar. 1, 2008), http://psychrights.org/aboutus.htm. 
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interest is instead on preventing the forced medication of patients 
with what it describes as "brain damaging psychiatric drugs."7I 
What happened between Egilman's execution of the 
Protective Order Endorsement and his contact of Gottstein is not 
completely clear, but it seems fairly certain that Egilman contacted 
Times reporter Alex Berenson and suggested that Berenson would be 
interested in some of the documents Egilman had received under the 
Protective Order. 72 Recognizing the challenge presented by the 
Protective Order, Berenson apparently suggested that Egilman 
contact Gottstein, whom Berenson knew, based on prior contacts, to 
be interested in psychiatric medication issues.73  When Egilman 
contacted him, Gottstein understood it was in an effort to get 
assistance disseminating documents that were then subject to a 
Protective Order. 74  In fact, Gottstein requested a copy of the 
Protective Order, but (per Gottstein's testimony) Egilman said that 
Gottstein "didn't want it" and Gottstein "didn't push it."' 75 Gottstein 
testified that Egilman was in some way trying to protect Gottstein: 
"My kind of sense was that if I didn't have [the Protective Order], 
then I wouldn't be charged with the knowledge of it." 76 By the end 
of the phone call, it was clear to Gottstein that he would attempt to 
find a case in which he could subpoena the documents. 77 Further, it 
was clear to Gottstein that, at least as far as Egilman was concerned, 
the purpose of the subpoena was to get the documents distributed to 
an array of specified individuals, including journalists and staffers 
from Congress. 
78 
Gottstein, as he and Egilman expected, did indeed find a case 
for which he could issue a subpoena for the documents. 79 He did so, 
71. Id. 
72. Zyprexa Injunction,474 F. Supp. 2d at 400-01,403. 
73. Id.at 400. 
74. In Gottstein's letter to the special master in December of 2006, he wrote 
that, in the course of the phone call with Egilman, he "learned that [Egilman] had 
access to secret Eli Lilly documents pertaining to Zyprexa," suggesting that the 
phone call was not directed to the document production from the start. Letter from 
James Gottstein to Special Master Peter H. Woodin (Dec. 17, 2006) (on file with 
author). The apparent inconsistency is not particularly important for these 
purposes. 
75. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 401. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 400-01. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 401-02. 
THE RE VIEW OFLITIGATION [Vol. 27:4 
issuing a subpoena duces tecum dated December 6, 2006, in the case 
of In re Guardianship of B.B., an Alaska Superior Court 
proceeding. 8° That subpoena had a return date of December 20, 
2006, and included a document request to which the documents 
Egilman received under the Protective Order would be responsive. 
81 
Egilman faxed the subpoena to Lilly's general counsel on December 
6; he did not directly notify litigation counsel (either for the plaintiffs 
or the defendant). 82 On December 11, Gottstein served an amended 
subpoena requesting that Egilman produce the documents "as soon 
you can. ' 83 The stated reason for the amended subpoena and the 
shift in the production date was that Gottstein realized that the 
deposition was to be by telephone, and so that Egilman would be 
unable to bring the documents with him to the deposition. 
84 
Importantly, Egilman did not serve this amended subpoena on Lilly 
(either the General Counsel or litigation counsel), nor did he notify 
the Lanier firm. 85  This was despite the fact that Gottstein 
"repeatedly" told Egilman "that he should send the second subpoena 
to Lilly,"' 86 and despite the fact that the Protective Order itself 
80. Subpoena for Taking Deposition to David Egilman, In re Guardianship of 
B.B., No. 3AN-04-545 P/G (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2006). 
81. Id. Gottstein acknowledged that the patient "B.B." (referred to in some 
transcripts as "D.B.") may not have been on Zyprexa. Transcript of Hearing 
Before Hon. Jack Weinstein at 33, In re Zyprexa Litig., No. MDL 1596 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 16-17, 2007), first day available at http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/ 
CaseXX/EilLilly/01-16-07Transcript.txt, second day available at http:// 
psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/O 1-1 6-07Transcript.txt. Given 
PsychRights's general argument that the risks of psychiatric medications are 
insufficiently warned-of, and that involuntary treatment with them is inappropriate, 
I assume he would argue that any evidence of undisclosed risks within the 
documents would be relevant to the litigation. 
82. See also Letter from David Egilman to Brewster H. Jamieson (Dec. 15, 
2006) (on file with author) (indicating that he found the General Counsel's fax 
number in a CLE online, but not noting any effort to ask the Lanier Law Firm for 
contact information for Lilly's litigation counsel). The protective order specifies 
that the notice is to go to the designating party, so notifying Lilly through its 
general counsel's office is likely sufficient, even if it might evidence an intent to 
do the minimum necessary. 
83. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 401. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 402. 
86. Id. at 401. 
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required that the producing party be informed of the date on which 
production was requested.8 
Dr. Egilman began sending documents (via FTP transfer) to 
Gottstein almost immediately, starting on December 12.88 The next 
day, Lilly's litigation counsel contacted the Lanier law firm to 
discuss the pending subpoena-which, as far as Lilly knew, had a 
return date of December 20. Richard Meadow, an attorney at the 
Lanier firm, then contacted Egilman. As Meadow testified in a 
hearing on the matter: 
Q: You spoke to Dr. Egilman on December 13, 
correct? 
A: Without looking at it, I believe so, yes. 
Q: That was the Wednesday, December 13? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you told him not to produce documents 
requested in this subpoena that had been issued from 
the State of Alaska? 
A: I said don't do anything with the subpoena 
until you hear from me. 
Q: And you did that because you knew there was 
a process that was being followed under the protective 
order and that Lilly had already started that process, 
correct? 
A: I had received a phone call from [Lilly lawyer] 
Andy Rogoff and I told him that I would reach out to 
Dr. Egilman and tell him not to do anything. 
Q: And he said -- what did Dr. Egilman say to 
you? 
A: He just said yes, Rick. 
Q: And you -- what did you understand that to 
mean? 
A: That he understood that I told him don't do 
anything. I don't want to read into other than what 
he said to me. 
87. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1596, 2004 WL 3520247, at 
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2004). 
88. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 401-03. 
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Q: Did you later learn that Dr. Egilman had 
already begun transferring documents to Mr. 
Gottstein? 
Yes. 89A: 
Judge Weinstein concluded that the shift in production date, 
rather than merely being a necessity for the telephonic deposition, 
was in fact a "subterfuge." 90  Gottstein testified that he did not 
review the documents upon receipt; instead, he immediately began 
burning multiple copies of the documents to DVDs, distributing 
them to at least fifteen people, including both reporters and 
activists. 91 As promised, the documents were delivered to the New 
York Times's Alex Berenson. 
The New York Times (the only print publication to which 
Gottstein provided the documents) published articles by Berenson 
almost immediately, with three stories run on the front page between 
December 17 and December 21.92 The articles relied heavily on the 
documents obtained from Egilman via Gottstein. 
Contemporaneously, the documents were widely distributed 
online. One of the recipients, Mind Freedom International, posted a 
statement on December 29, 2006, noting the dispute that had taken 
place in the meantime and also linking to a site providing 
information about the "Tor" software 93 and how it could be used to 
obtain the documents. 
94 
89. Transcript of Hearing Before Hon. Jack Weinstein, supra note 81, at 199­
200. 
90. Zyprexa Injunction,474 F. Supp. 2d at 401,402-03. 
91. Id. at 402. 
92. Id. at 405; see also Alex Berenson, Eli Lilly Said to Play Down Risk of 
Top Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at Al; Alex Berenson, Drug Files Show 
Maker Promoted Unapproved Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at Al; Alex 
Berenson, DisparityEmerges in Lilly Data on Schizophrenia Drug, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2006, at Cl. 
93. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
94. Posting of mindfreedom-news@intemex.net to news:misc.activism. 
progressive (Dec. 31, 2006, 02:32:53 CST), news:en7sjl$5edS1@pencil.math. 
missouri.edu, available at http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=en7sjl%2 4 5ed 
%241%40pencil.math.missouri.edu. The posting contained the following 
"disclaimer" at its end: "In the public interest, MindFreedom is forwarding the 
anonymous alerts referred to on this page and in MFI emails. MFI did not 
originate these alerts, MFI does not vouch for their authenticity or accuracy, that's 
all the information we have, MFI is not providing advice about the legality of 
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Evidently following up on its December 13 contact with the 
Lanier firm, on December 14-two days after Egilman had already 
started producing documents, but still six days prior to the original 
subpoena's return date-Lilly wrote to Egilman and Gottstein, 
directing both to refrain from producing documents unless directed 
by the relevant state court in Alaska. 95 Egilman responded the same 
day, this time noting that he had already started producing the 
documents and arguing that he had complied with the Protective 
Order.96 As Judge Weinstein drily noted, "[H]e did not address the 
question of why he never notified Lilly about the second subpoena 
with its revised production date." 97  Upon learning that the 
documents had already been produced, Lilly wrote to Gottstein the 
following day, asking that he return the documents, cease further 
distribution, request the return of them from those to whom he had 
sent them, and identify the recipients. 
98 
C. The DocumentsAre Virally Distributed 
By then, however, the documents were already beyond the 
control of any one person or group of people. Gottstein had sent 
them to enough people-and enough of those people had sent the 
documents (electronically) to enough other people-that, due to 
some recipients' relative technological savvy and sheer volume, the 
documents simply were impossible to recover. 
Some of the recipients immediately made efforts to distribute 
the documents as widely as possible. Robert Whitaker, for instance, 
made it quite clear that he anticipated potential challenges to the 
documents' availability: 
downloading the 'ZyprexaKills' files, MFI is not encouraging anyone to conduct 
illegal activities regarding these files, and MFI itself is not providing the 
'ZyprexaKills' files for download." Id. 
95. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 402. 
96. Not long after receipt of this letter, the Lanier firm directed him to return 
all Zyprexa documents and terminated him from the Zyprexa litigation. Id. at 403. 
I have been told, but cannot confirm, that he has been fired from other work for the 
Lanier firm. 
97. Id. 
98. Id.at 403. The other efforts to retrieve the documents are discussed infra 
Part II.E. 
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I would consider building a website that would, ahem, 
make all the documents available. What could they 
do to me? And how could they know how the 
documents got to me? There are several channels 
apparently that could be the source. You should 
proceed now in whatever way makes it easiest for 
you, and let others worry about getting this 
information out or making it public.
99 
Over the following couple of weeks, several grou0s 
associated with some recipients distributed the documents widely. 
One organization called MindFreedom (whose board member Judi 
Chamberlain was a recipient of the documents) made extensive e-
mail and web communications informing supporters of where the 
documents could be downloaded. The group's executive director 
sent an e-mail to the organization's listserv of several thousand 
people on Christmas day, linking to a website with the documents 
and noting that the anonymous people distributing the documents 
(the distribution he was linking to) were "counting on the fact that 
many courts are closed today."' 01 On December 30, a press release 
noted the injunction but also directed readers to sites "not sponsored 
by MindFreedom" where the documents could be downloaded, 
including both Tor sites and a free document transfer site, file­
upload.com. 1
02 
Another recipient (and recipient of the TRO), Vera Sharav, 
posted the injunction on the website of the organization "Alliance for 
Human Research Protection," along with the following notation: 
"See the court injunction several of us received ... but the internet is 
an uncontrolled information highway. You never know where and 
when the court's suppressed documents might surface."' 0 3 The 
99. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Info on "ZyprexaKills" Campaign-Portal (Dec. 30, 2006), 
http://www.mindfreedom.org/know/psych-drug-corp/eli-lilly-secrets/zyprexakills, 
reprinted in Proposed Findings of Fact by Eli Lilly & Co. app. at 195-96, In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2007), availableat 
http://psychrights.org/states/alaska/casexx/EilLilly/Exxhibits2LillyProposedFindin 
gsofFact.pdf. These transfer technologies are described infra. 
103. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 407-08. 
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posting concluded with links to two websites that, at the time, 
evidently had the documents available for download. 1
04 
In other words, whether or not the recipients were explicitly 
told at any point that the documents they received were likely to be 
the subject of further litigation, they knew that widespread and rapid 
distribution was, for their purposes, desirable.' 0 5 And they used the 
available technologies-technologies that have come into existence 
in the past five to ten years-to achieve those goals. 
By December 23, 2006, ten days after Egilman started to 
transfer the documents to Gottstein, the documents had been 
distributed via "Tor."' 0 6 They also promptly became available via 
the file sharing system known as BitTorrent.10 7 As of this writing, a 
Google search for the term "zyprexakills.tar.gz" (the most common 
name for the file archive) results in 435 results. 08 Most likely some 
number of those results point to common sources, but the results 
nonetheless indicate the breadth of the documents' distribution. 
The ease and speed with which the documents were 
distributed-and with which any future leaked documents will be 
distributed-is critical for understanding why it is that the old model 
of enforcement post-violation is no longer an option. Thus, a 
summary of the various technologies used is appropriate. 
The first means of distribution-and the most important for 
purposes of this Article, as it was the distribution that simply could 
not be stopped-was via "Tor," a network developed to facilitate 
anonymous Internet usage. °9 Created with the support of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, among others, the network's 
developers describe it as "a network of virtual tunnels that allows 
104. Id. 
105. Of course, virtually every document in the archive has imprinted on 
every page "Confidential and Subject to Protective Order," making it not 
particularly difficult to guess that the documents were at least potentially obtained 
under questionable circumstances. 
106. See Posting of Rafi to FreeCulture @ NYU, http://www.freeculturenyu. 
org/2006/12/23/zyprexa-kills-campain/#comment-2512 (Dec. 23, 2006, 4:02 PM 
EST) (providing a link to http://digg.com/security/ZyprexaMemosLeaked 
_usingTor). 
107. See Posting of bigwyrm to http://digg.com/security/ZyprexaMemos_ 
Leaked-usingTor?t=-4649295#c4649295 (Jan. 9, 2007) (claiming that the files 
were available on BitTorrent and providing a link to http://thepiratebay.org/ 
tor/3589817/ZyprexaKills.tar.gz). 
108. Google Search, http://www.google.com/search?q=zyprexakills.tar.gz. 
109. Tor: Overview (Feb. 27, 2008), http://tor.eff.org/overview.html.en. 
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people and groups to improve their privacy and security on the 
0Internet." 11 Most importantly for the distribution of documents 
such as these, "Tor's hidden services let users publish web sites and 
other services without needing to reveal the location of the site."''1 
By using those services, a URL is created with the top-level domain 
'.onion," rather than the common ".com .... net," '.org," or any other 
top-level domain. 112 Thus, in this case, one of the ultimate recipients 
of the Zyprexa documents set up a website that was reachable at 
http://tdkhrvozivoez5ad.onion/. 113 The advantage to the creator of 
using a "hidden site" is just that-it is hidden. Unless the operator 
errs in setting it up, the location (physical, network, or other) is not 
able to be determined. 
The details are not terribly important, but in essence, the Tor 
network passes data along through a number of cooperating servers, 
each of which only knows a little bit about the origin and destination 
of the data. 114 Put another way, each server only knows where the 
data packet came from and where the data packet is going, but 
neither the ultimate origin nor the ultimate destination. 15 Further, 
each step is separately encrypted, and the path taken changes every 
minute or so. 
Using the same basic approach, the Tor network can provide 
"hidden" websites.117 Unless the site's location is disclosed in some 
other way, the reader cannot determine the site's origin, and the 
proprietor of the site cannot identify anyone who posts onto the 
site.118 Thus, it is impossible for a party or the court to identify the 
proprietor of the Tor site used to host the Zyprexa documents. 
119 
110. Id.; cf Alex Curtis, Senator Ted Stevens Speaks on Network Neutrality, 
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, June 28, 2006, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/497. 
111. Tor: Overview, supranote 109. 
112. See Tor: Hidden Service Configuration Instructions (Feb. 27, 2008), 
http://tor.eff.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en (describing the "hidden 
services"). 
113. See Posting of fgrieczfbc to FreeCulture @ NYU, http://www. 
freeculturenyu.org/2006/12/23/zyprexa-kills-campain/#comment-3353 (Jan. 1, 
2007, 10:12 PM EST) (linking to http:// tdkhrvozivoez5ad.onion!). 
114. Tor: Overview, supra note 109. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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Similarly, BitTorrent provides an alternate means of 
distribution that is extremely difficult to trace and shut down. 
BitTorrent "is a file-sharing program that allows users to download a 
file from many other users, rather than from a central server like 
Napster. ' 20 Many-perhaps most--of the 435 results noted 
above 21 are references to BitTorrent indices providing access to the 
document archive. The structure of BitTorrent makes it difficult to 
stop data distribution not because it is particularly difficult to find 
out who is using it, but because of the distributed nature of the files 
being delivered. 122  The files are divided up amongst the many 
computers that are part of the network and that have the relevant file, 
so that someone downloading the Zyprexa documents, for example, 
might be downloading the archive from a dozen different computers 
around the world. 123  Each new downloader represents another 
potential seed for the archive. Thus, even if someone attempting to 
enforce an injunction or protective order could find eleven of the 
twelve, that twelfth could quickly multiply again,
24
with the endeavor 
turning into a high-tech game of Whac-A-Mole. 1
Finally, a number of anonymous file transfer sites have come 
into existence since roughly 2003. With names like YouSendIt.com, 
RapidShare.de, SendThisFile.com, and the like, these sites are 
advertised as ways to avoid problems with limitations on e-mail 
attachment sizes.' 25  In addition to those uses, these sites are 
120. Dan Leroy, If It's Live, It's Probably Already Online, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 2004, at CN14. 
121. Google Search, supra note 108. 
122. Paul Boutin, Caveat MPAA: Meet Bittorrent,the File-SharingNetwork 
That Makes Trading Movies a Breeze, SLATE, Feb. 27, 2004, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2096316/. Indeed, the creator of BitTorrent has "refused 
to add privacy protections that could keep users from being traced by, say, 
Hollywood lawyers." Id. That said, various services purport to block one's 
identity while using peer-to-peer software such as BitTorrent. Paul Gil, 
Anonymous Surfing: How to Conceal Your Digital Identity While Online (Apr. 
17, 2007), http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/internetl0l/f/anonymoussurf.htm. 
In fact, Tor could theoretically be used in conjunction with BitTorrent, but the 
download speeds are reportedly slowed dramatically, since it is not designed for 
such use. See generally Digg - Bittorrent Masking: How to Avoid Getting Tracked 
as you Download, http://www.digg.com/software/BittorrentMasking:_How-to_ 
AvoidGettingTracked asYouDownload. 
123. Boutin, supra note 122. 
124. WHACAMOLE.COM, http://whacamole.com/. 
125. For instance, Comcast prohibits attachments greater than 10 MB on its 
outgoing mail server. Help - Faq - Comcast.net, http://www.comcast.net/help/faq/ 
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frequently used for (legal or illegal) distribution of music and video 
files, and, in this case, for the rapid and relatively anonymous 
distribution of large numbers of documents.' 26  Though many of 
these sites nominally require registration for some services, others do 
not, and those that do can often be evaded through the use of a 
"disposable e-mail address" provided by various services like 
Mailinator.com. 
Since the leak described herein, a new website­
WikiLeaks.org-has been formed with the stated purpose of 
"developing an uncensorable system for untraceable mass document 
leaking and public analysis."12 7 More specifically, the planned site 
"combines the protection and anonymity of cutting-edge 
cryptographic technologies with the transparency and simplicity of a 
wiki interface."' 128  What precisely it will include is unclear, and it 
appears to focus primarily on government documents from outside of 
the United States, but it is, at the least, indicative that the use of the 
Internet for widespread distribution is growing and will continue to 
do so. 
Together, these technologies make the widespread 
distribution of tens of thousands of pages a trivial matter, with 
virtually no financial cost besides Internet access. Put another way, 
today's Internet makes any leak an immediate and irreversible 
deluge. And that is precisely what happened in this case, as
29
 
described above and below. 1
index.jsp?faq=Email 117627. These services still have size limitations, but files 
are fairly easily split up into smaller sections. See, e.g., Frequently Asked 
Questions IYouSendit, http://www.yousendit.com/cms/faq (limiting transfers to 2 
GB for paid accounts and 100 MB for "lite" accounts); RapidShare Webhosting + 
Webspace, http://rapidshare.de/ (allowing up to 300 MB per file). 
126. As of this writing, there appear to be few if any instances of the 
documents on those file services. The uploads (especially with free accounts) 
typically expire within a week or so. When, on January 8, 2007, I wrote that 
"[o]nce I thought of the better approach (which on better days I would have tried 
first)" it took less than thirty seconds to find the documents, I was referring to 
performing a Google search for zyprexakills.tar.gz. Childs, supra note 60. At that 
time, my recollection is that there were at least five easily-found links to the 
document archive on sites like YouSendlt.com. 
127. Wikileaks, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks. 
128. Wikileaks:About, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:About. 
129. The details are not critical, but, as noted above, the documents have 
persistently been available--easily-through one or more of the technologies 
described above. 
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D. The Retrieval Efforts 
Throughout the time period of late December of 2006 and 
January of 2007, the litigants (including the plaintiffs' attorneys in 
the tort litigation) and the court were making significant efforts to 
retrieve the documents 13 0 -efforts which were, as described above, 
largely futile. 
On December 15 (three days after Egilman had started 
sending documents to Gottstein, and two days after Gottstein started 
distributing documents to over a dozen people), the discovery special 
master, Peter Woodin, learned of the documents' delivery to 
Gottstein. 131 He issued an order requested jointly by the plaintiffs 
and defendant; that order directed Gottstein and Egilman to deliver 
all Zyprexa documents (including copies delivered to others) to 
Woodin's office. 132 Gottstein responded by e-mail, challenging the 
special master's authority, the court's jurisdiction, and the ex parte 
nature of the order, but also stating that he had ceased distribution of 
the documents. 133 He did not report any effort to comply with the 
rest of the order-i.e., attempting to retrieve the documents from 
others to whom he had delivered them. 1
34 
Three days later, Lilly and the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee 
jointly requested an injunction requiring the documents' return. The 
initial request was to the magistrate judge, who was clearly unhappy, 
describing the events as "disturbing" and as having the "ring of 
collusion."1 35 He continued: 
I think that what happened here was an intentional 
violation of Judge Weinstein's orders .... I per­
sonally am not in a position to order you [Gottstein] 
130. See discussion infra. 
131. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 404-05 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007). 
132. Id. 
133. E-mail from James Gottstein to Special Master Peter H. Woodin (Dec. 
17, 2006), available at http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/e­
mail2Woodin 12-16-06.pdf. 
134. Id. 
135. Transcript of Telephone Conference Before Hon. Robert Mann at 9, In 
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1596 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2006), 
available at http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/ 12-18­
06HearingNo 1Transcript.pdf. 
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to return the document. I can't make you return them, 
but I can make you wish you had because I think this 
is highly improper not only to have obtained the 
documents on short notice without Lilly being 
advised of the amendment but then to disseminate 
them publicly before it could be litigated. It certainly 
smacks [of] bad faith. 1
36 
The same day, the parties jointly approached the emergency 
judge, Judge Cogan. 137 After hearing from Lilly, the Plaintiffs' 
Steering Committee, and, through counsel, Gottstein, Judge Cogan 
issued a temporary restraining order, finding that Gottstein 
"deliberately and knowingly aided and abetted Dr. David Egilman's 
breach of' the protective order.138 Gottstein was enjoined from any 
further distribution and ordered to return all documents (including 
copies) and to identify all of the people to whom he distributed the 
documents. 139 Gottstein subsequently contacted all of the people to 
whom he had transmitted the documents; many of them returned the 
documents, while others did not. 140 He certified compliance with the 
order by letter on December 21.141 But of course, he was not 
required to actually retrieve documents from others, but only to 
request their return. 
On December 29, the parties to the MDL jointly requested a 
preliminary injunction reaching those people who had not complied 
with Gottstein's request to return the documents. 142 That injunction 
was issued the same day by Judge Cogan, barring twelve individuals 
from disseminating the documents, requiring the documents' 
removal from any website to which they had posted them, and 
requiring that those individuals inform any further recipients of the 
terms of the preliminary injunction. 143 At a January 3, 2007 hearing 
before Judge Weinstein, the parties who were present agreed to the 
136. Id. at 10; Zyprexa Injunction,474 F. Supp. 2d at 405. 
137. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 405-06, 428. 
138. Id. at 405-06 (quoting In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 
1596, 2006 WL 3877528, at *1 (E.D.N.Y Dec. 19, 2006) (order granting 
mandatory injunction)). 
139. The TRO also required that he preserve all relevant communications. 
140. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 407-08. 
143. Id. at 407. 
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preliminary injunction's extension to January 16, when an 
evidentiary hearing was scheduled.144 A day later, Judge Weinstein 
agreed to expand the enjoined parties to include two additional 
groups, five websites, and an individual, all of whom were 
distributing the documents. 145 And a two-day evidentiary hearing 
began on January 16, 2007, with representation present for most of 
the enjoined parties and websites, in addition to representation by the 
Electronic Freedom Foundation for an anonymous person who 
wished to post the documents online. 146  On the 16th, Judge 
Weinstein also extended the preliminary injunction until such time as 
he considered a permanent injunction. 147 Four witnesses testified: 
Gottstein himself, Richard Meadow (an attorney with the Lanier 
firm), Vera Sharav, and David Oaks. 1
48 
Judge Weinstein issued that injunction on February 13, 
2007.149 The injunction was, as noted above, almost entirely 
ineffectual in actually limiting access to the documents.150 Today (a 
year later as of this writing), the documents are readily available, still 
emblazoned with "Eli Lilly-Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation" 
and "Confidential and Subject to Protective Order" at the bottom of 
every page. Also as of this writing, no contempt motions have been 
brought against any of the people involved, though filings suggest 
that a settlement of issues relating to the document distribution may 
be forthcoming. 151 
144. Id. at 408. 
145. Id. 
146. Transcript of Hearing Before Hon. Jack Weinstein, supra note 81, at 1­
3. Alex Berenson of the New York Times was not represented; he was also not 
subject to the injunction. On January 29, Judge Weinstein issued an "invitation" to 
Berenson "to confront testimony received [at the hearing] implicating him in a 
conspiracy to obtain and publish confidential documents sealed by this court." 
Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 408. Through counsel, Berenson declined. 
Id. at 411. 
147. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
148. As noted above, Sharav and Oaks are both associated with recipients of 
the documents. 
149. Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385. 
150. Zeller, supra note 2. 
151. Motion for Extension of Deadlines, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
Nos. 07-1107-cv, 07-1030-cv (2d Cir. May 29, 2007), available at 
http://psychrights.org/States/Alaska/CaseXX/EilLilly/InjunctionAppeal/90­
dayExtensionMotion.pdf. 
596 THE RE VIEW OFLITIGATION [Vol. 27:4 
In early September 2007, Lilly and Egilman settled any 
potential contempt charges. Egilman agreed to pay $100,000 (to be 
donated to a mental health charity selected by Lilly), acknowledged 
violation of the protective order, 152 acknowledged that Lilly had a 
story that he did not seek to tell through his document release, and 
acknowledged that his targeted leak helped plaintiffs. 53  He 
additionally expressed "regret" for his actions. 154 
Potential contempt charges against Gottstein and others 
apparently remain possible. As of October 2007, Gottstein reported 
that he was hopeful that settlement talks would be successful, and his 
appeal has been suspended during their pendency. 1
55 
152. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-CV-00504, slip op. at 1-2 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (stipulated order). 
153. See Declaration of David Egilman, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 1:07-CV-00504-JBW-RLM (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/files/EgilmanAffidavit.pdf. A bit 
oddly, Egilman and his counsel argued that Egilman did not acknowledge doing 
anything illegal, evidently concluding that "illegal" would only include clearly 
criminal conduct. Ed Silverman, Lilly Settles with Zyprexa Document Leaker, 
PHARMALOT, Sept. 7, 2007, availableat http://www.pharmalot.com/2007/09/lilly­
settles-with-zyprexa-document-leaker/; Avery Johnson, Lilly and Leaker Settle, 
but Arguments Drag On, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG, Sept. 7, 2007, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/09/07/lilly-and-leaker-settle-but-arguments-drag­
on/. While parsing the affidavit is not central to this Article, I think that the 
admission of a violation of a federal judge's order, see Declaration of David 
Egilman, supra ("I violated Case Management Order No. 3 ('CMO-3'), which is in 
force in the Zyprexa MDL."), can reasonably be called the admission of illegal 
activity. 
Additionally, though Egilman's affidavit explicitly states that he "released 
documents that did not represent the entire set of information concerning Lilly's 
action and knowledge," he disputed any characterization of what he did as "cherry­
picking." He stated that he released all of the documents that he had (though he 
does not state whether he previously had other documents or could have accessed 
more), and thus says that he was not cherry-picking. Declaration of David 
Egilman, supra. Whether only obtaining "bad documents" constitutes misconduct 
on the part of a scientist or an expert witness is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but it's an interesting question. 
154. Declaration of David Egilman, supra note 153. 
155. Mr. Gottstein told me this in an October 2007 interview on a radio 
show I do, Swimming with Sharks, on WXOJ-LP in Northampton, Massachusetts. 
Unfortunately, the recording of the show did not work. 
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E. The Documents' Contents 
The full range of the leaked documents is not particularly 
important for present purposes, but several observations are relevant. 
First, as alluded to earlier, the importance of many of the documents 
is readily overstated. As just one example, a number of the 
documents contain summaries of analyses of spontaneous adverse 
event reports. Such reports come from voluntary reporting by health 
care providers and others and, according to most epidemiologists and 
regulatory agencies, can be used only for signal generation.
1 56 
While it is entirely appropriate to perform and consider such 
analyses, the coverage (both in traditional news outlets and online 
sources) confirms that the analyses are easily over-read. 1 5 7 That is 
not to say that the information in them is irrelevant to the product's 
safety-only that many of them lack context to provide a full
58 
understanding. 
156. Statement of Janet Woodcock before Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources (May 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2006/mifepristoneO517.html. 
157. The analyses also contain a number of clearly confidential items, 
including sales figures, comparative sales figures (which are typically obtained 
from third-party vendors under non-disclosure agreements), and the like, which 
helps to explain why they can properly be designated as confidential. 
As noted infra note 180, research suggests that people generally have 
difficulty accurately discerning the tone of e-mails, due presumably to the offhand 
way in which they are authored. Though it seems less so in the Zyprexa litigation, 
my experience suggests that many of the "bad documents" used by plaintiffs in 
products litigation are created in a similar fashion--casual e-mails among 
colleagues, often using shorthand that, read years later, creates a different 
impression than intended. Certainly such e-mails have some evidentiary force 
regardless, but those documents demand context even more than usual, I suggest. 
158. While it is difficult to quantify-and most efforts to do so have been 
done by people with a financial interest in the outcome-there is also the danger 
that publicity about potential (but uncertain) dangers of a medicine will cause 
patients to take themselves off of the medicine. New Survey Shows Product 
Liability Litigation May Jeopardize Treatment Optionsfor People with Severe 
Mental Illnesses, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, June 14, 2007, http://www. 
medicalnewstoday.com/articles/74116.php; see Press Release, National Council 
for Community Behavioral Healthcare, Barriers to Treatment Survey Findings, 
http://nccbh.browsermedia.com/cs/barriers to-treatment_survey-findings (indi­
cating that plaintiffs' lawyers' advertising can reduce compliance with 
prescriptions). 
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Second, the documents include some designated as 
"confidential" that are not, at least on their face, confidential. 159 For 
instance, a 1996 warning letter from the FDA's marketing regulatory 
arm is designated as confidential, 60 though these documents are (at 
least now) routinely placed on the FDA's website.161 A brief review 
of the documents indicates that few fit into this category, but then 
again, that is consistent with what Dr. Egilman's evident intent was. 
Given the massive volume of documents produced, some improper 
designations are no doubt inevitable, but some designations (at least 
in some cases) are likely made due more to a fear of exposure than a 
firm belief in the documents' confidentiality. 
F. OtherExamples ofProtective Order Violations 
The Zyprexa document leak is perhaps the best example of 
the modem implications of a document leak under a protective order. 
But it is far from the only example. 
While not an example from a mass tort, a high-profile 
document leak in Mississippi and Alabama has led to civil and 
criminal charges against prominent plaintiffs' lawyer Dickie Scruggs 
in litigation relating to Hurricane Katrina and insurance coverage. 62 
In brief, two sisters worked for a company that provided services to 
State Farm, helping provide claims adjustment services in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.1 63 The sisters believed that they 
witnessed fraud on the part of State Farm and began to photocopy 
159. This might be in part due to the fact that the protective order allows 
parties to unilaterally designate documents as confidential, only requiring a good 
faith belief in the propriety of the decision. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 
2d 385, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
160. Letter from Kenneth R. Feather, Food & Drug Admin., to Charles R. 
Perry, Jr., Eli Lilly & Co. (Nov. 14, 1996) (on file with author). 
161. Warning Letters and Notice of Violation Letters to Pharmaceutical 
Companies (Mar. 4, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/. The FDA web page 
only goes back to 1997, and some letters on the page are redacted to remove 
confidential information. The Zyprexa warning letter may well contain some 
confidential information, but redaction likely could have readily resolved the issue. 
162. See E.A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, No. 3:07-MC-036-SAA, 2007 WL 
4276906, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2007) (discussing procedural history where 
plaintiff moved that court find Scruggs in contempt for violating preliminary 
injunction on discovery documents). 
163. E.A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, 508 F. Supp. 2d 986, 988 (N.D. Ala. 
2007). 
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documents that they believed to constitute evidence of improper 
conduct by State Farm. 164 They then (in early 2006) hired Scruggs 
to represent them as whistleblowers and then to defend them against 
lawsuits b-r State Farm alleging breach of their employment 
agreement. Not long afterwards, they became paid "consultants" 
to Scruggs's team of Mississippi lawyers involved in insurance 
coverage litigation relating to Katrina.16 In December 2006, U.S. 
District Judge William Acker ordered that the putative 
whistleblowing sisters and their attorneys return the documents to 
State Farm, but Scruggs sent a set to Mississippi Attorney General 
Jim Hood. 167  Judge Acker concluded that "Scruggs willfully 
violated the court's December 8, 2006 preliminary injunction, and 
that referral to a prosecutor is the appropriate course to take to 
vindicate the court's authority."' 68  The Department of Justice 
declined to prosecute Scruggs. 169 Judge Acker then appointed two 
private attorneys as special prosecutors, 170 and, as of this writing, the 
case is in pre-trial proceedings. 17 1 The leaked documents (and the 
sisters' allegations relating to their experiences working for the 
adjuster) have been used both to attempt to recruit new clients and as 
a way to push for settlement. 172 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 988-89. 
167. Id. at 989-91. 
168. Id. at 995. 
169. E.A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, Civil Action No. 06-AR-1752-S, 2007 
WL 2212678, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 26, 2007) (order appointing special 
prosecutors). 
170. Id. 
171. Peter Lattman, The Latest in the Contempt Case Against Dickie 
Scruggs, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG, Oct. 17, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2007/10/17/the-latest-in-the-contempt-case-against-dickie-scruggs/; United States 
v. Scruggs, No. CR-07-CO-03-25-s (N.D. Ala. Aug. 21, 2007) (allegations of 
criminal contempt of court). 
172. In a television advertisement for the Scruggs Katrina Group, one of the 
sisters, Kerri Rigsby, discusses why viewers should not accept any offers from 
insurance companies: "It's rigged against you. How do I know? I'm Kerri Rigsby 
and I used to work for State Farm. I know firsthand how far they will go to avoid 
paying your claim. Take it from me, you need a lawyer not the Insurance 
Commissioner's mediation program." YouTube - Lawyer's TV Ad Takes On Big 
Insurance (May 25, 2007), http://youtube.com/watch ?v=7YSnfAfn6DA. 
During the pendency of the potential contempt charges, one member of the 
Scruggs Katrina Group offered to return some portion of the stolen documents "as 
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Other examples are largely not as well documented as either 
the Zyprexa or the Scruggs cases. By way of example, there were at 
least allegations of improper distribution of confidential or privileged 
documents in tobacco litigation, 173 tire litigation, 174 the litigation 
relating to the statin Baycol (as described above), 75 and litigation 
relating to bone screws. 176 Strikingly, David Egilman himself was 
found to have violated a prior gag order in beryllium litigation.' 
77 
part of a settlement offer." E.A. Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, Civil Action No. 06-AR­
1752-S, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ala. July 15, 2007) (order refusing to impose civil 
contempt charges). 
173. See Defendant Brown & Williamson Tabacco Corporation's Motion in 
Limine to Exclude Its Privilaged and Proected Stolen Documents, Newcomb v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tabacco Co., No. 88913-8 T.D. (Tenn. Cir. Court, Shelby County 
Jan. 12, 1999). The litigation over the documents in that litigation is complex, to 
say the least. Plaintiffs contended that the defendants waived privilege as to some, 
and that others lost their privileged status under the crime fraud exception. Such a 
discussion is far beyond the scope of this Article; I note it simply as an example. 
Notably, Dickie Scruggs of the criminal contempt charges was also involved in the 
tobacco document, purchasing the paralegal who leaked the documents a home and 
a boat. Interviews: Richard Scruggs, Frontline: Inside the Tobacco Deal, http:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/interviews/scruggs.html. 
174. Nevil v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 294-051, 1999 WL 1338625 (S.D. 
Ga. Dec. 23, 1999) (order sanctioning plaintiffs expert for disclosing confidential 
information in unrelated litigation). The defendants in that case did not seek 
significant sanctions, and the court did not impose significant sanctions, instead 
essentially reiterating the terms of the extant protective order. Id. In another tire 
case, a plaintiff's attorney was sanctioned for disclosing deposition testimony 
subject to a protective order to another attorney in different litigation against the 
same defendant. McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 
801CV1306T27TGW, 2005 WL 3372855 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2005) (awarding the 
defendant attorney's fees for enforcing the protective order), affirmed, 186 F. 
App'x 930 (1 lth Cir. 2006). 
175. See discussion supra note 19. As noted there, I was involved in the 
defense of the Baycol litigation and remain a consultant to the company. 
176. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Orthopedics for the FDA's Forked 
Tongue, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1997, at A17. 
177. Pamela A. MacLean, Law Firms Not Liable in Alleged Web Hacking 
Case, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp? 
id=1134036310706. In that case, the court ordered that participants not make 
extrajudicial statements; Egilman was found to have violated that order by posting 
statements on his password-protected website. The defendants obtained access to 
his statements by using a user name and password provided by a third-party. The 
trial court sanctioned Egilman; on appeal, he won reversal of the part of the 
sanctions that prohibited him from testifying in that courtroom in the future. 
Egilman v. Dist. Court (Plaut),No. 01CA1982, slip op. at 5 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 
5, 2002), available at http://egilman.com/Documents/JonesDay%20illegal 
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III. WHAT-IF ANYTHING-SHOULD CHANGE? 
Most serious and fundamental consideration of protective 
orders in mass litigation took place a decade or more ago.' 78 Even 
scholarship that is more recent builds largely on that earlier 
scholarship, without serious consideration of changes in circum­
stances that may counsel in favor of policy changes. The Zyprexa 
case described above provides stark examples of those changes, all 
of which relate in one way or another to technological changes. 
First, the sheer volume of documents has exploded. 
Communications that even ten or fifteen years ago might have been 
by phone or in person are frequently now made via e-mail, and those 
e-mails may end up being retained for years. While precise numbers 
are difficult to find, experienced mass tort lawyers confirm that the 
quantity of documents produced is larger by orders of magnitude 
than it was in even the early 1990s.179 Litigation that might have at 
one point produced, say, a million pages of documents now routinely 
results in tens of millions of pages. With that increase comes a 
concomitant increase in expenses in review and production, and the 
accompanying increased odds of errors in that process. Put briefly, 
non-confidential documents are more likely to be incorrectly 
designated, whether innocently or not. 
Second, in the world of immediate digital distribution, once a 
confidential document has been leaked to even one minimally 
technologically savvy person, it is almost certain to be permanently 
available. Even if the source of documents could be identified, often 
they are beyond the jurisdictional reach of interested courts and, in 
the unlikely event that they are retrieved, the documents are likely to 
pop up again elsewhere, without the context that a trial provides (and 
that judges cite in creating protective orders). 
The harm caused by a lack of contextualization is 
exacerbated by the nature of the documents in question. Research 
%20activities/appeals-court decision.pdf. It appears that one of the defense 
lawyers involved was disciplined for his part in obtaining access to the documents. 
Letter from Willam R. Garrett, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, State Bar of Texas, 
to David Egilman, care of Robert Greenberg (Oct. 2 2003), available at 
http://egilman.com/Documents/JonesDay%20illegal%20activities/stewart-bar.pdf. 
178. See supra Part I. 
179. One need only look at the multitude of electronic discovery services 
available today to at least infer that the electronic nature of communications has 
fundamentally changed document production quantities. 
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confirms what most users of electronic communications already 
know: people are not as thoughtful when writing electronic 
communications as they are in other contexts. 180 Thus, in addition to 
the inherent harm in the distribution of confidential documents and 
the extant risk of documents being distributed and reviewed in 
isolation, the danger of inaccurate impressions being created is 
increased when the documents in question are of this sort. Further, 
the probability of inaccurate impressions being given by such 
documents may increase the risk of non-innocent mis-designation of 
documents. 
Another potential danger of document leaks and the lack of 
context is the unwarranted creation of fear among patients on any 
particular medicine or users of any particular product in question. 
Industry-funded studies have suggested that advertisements for 
attorneys seeking clients on particular drugs may cause patients to 
take themselves off the medicines. 18 1 One can at least hypothesize 
that a similar cause-and-effect could take place from stories 
suggesting problems with a drug. 
Finally, any approach has to take into consideration public 
confidence and public interest in access to relevant information. If 
interested third-parties believe that material non-confidential 
information impacting public health will remain unavailable, the 
probability increases that they will attempt to distribute documents in 
violation of protective orders. 
180. See Justin Kruger et al., Egocentrism Over E-mail: Can We 
Communicate as Well as We Think?, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 925 
(2005); see also supra note 18 (discussing the problems with isolated documents). 
Of course, a lack of context for documents is not new; the most notorious 
"smoking gun" document, that of the Ford Pinto, was most thoroughly discussed 
by Gary Schwartz. Gary Schwartz, The Myth of the FordPinto Case,43 RUTGERS 
L. REv. 1013 (1991). I discuss the Pinto document every year in my Torts class, 
and students, many years after its first coming onto the national consciousness, still 
consistently know of it-and don't know the reality of it. More recently, a low-
level employee of Wyeth wrote an offensive e-mail complaining about having to 
deal with the settlements of claims for what she termed "fat people" scared of a 
"silly" problem, and, by most accounts, that e-mail was at least important to 
plaintiffs' very successful pursuit of the diet drug litigation. Robert D. Brown­
stone, Preserveor Perish;Destroy or Drown-eDiscovery Morphs into Electronic 
Information Management, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2006). My former law firm 
was involved in the diet drug litigation; I was not. 
181. William Childs, Ads & PatientCare, TORTSPROF BLOG, June 14, 2007, 
http://lawprofessors .typepad.com/tortsprof/2007/06/ads-patientcar.html. 
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Ultimately, the umbrella protective order in concept remains 
sound and has the flexibility to address all of these concerns. The 
fundamental reasons supporting such orders still exist. Indeed, if 
anything, such orders are even more necessary, given the utter 
impracticability of judges individually reviewing the hundreds of 
thousands or millions of pages in question. The question, then, is 
what to do with these concerns-the implications of the growth in 
document numbers and of immediate distribution. 
First, Judge Weinstein's desire for consistency' 82 is still a 
good idea. While protective orders today certainly have many 
similarities, there would be value in more consistency, if for no other 
reason than to permit interested parties to identify their scope 
readily. 
Second, protective orders should have specific and 
transparent mechanisms for third-party involvement in confi­
dentiality challenges. As described above, the parties to litigation 
frequently have incentives to cooperate in maintaining documents as 
secret even without justification-the plaintiffs' counsel to increase 
leverage, the defendants' counsel to avoid distribution of harmful 
(but non-secret) documents. Third-party involvement can serve as a 
useful check on these interests, and, at least in mass tort litigation 
where these umbrella protective orders are likely to take place, there 
are frequently public interest organizations (or third-party payors) 
who are interested in challenging confidentiality. The protective 
order should be crafted to facilitate the prompt resolution of such 
challenges. Providing an outlet for legitimate challenges to 
documents' confidentiality will reduce the incentive for third-parties 
to make an end-run around the protective orders' obligations. 
Third, the requirements relating to the production of 
protected documents should be made unambiguous. In the Zyprexa 
case, the leakers argued that Lilly was given sufficient notice, and 
the protective order itself did not provide a bright line as to what 
notice was required.18 3 While any actual litigation over the ensuing 
disputes need not have specific timelines laid out, a specific and 
182. WEINSTEIN, supranote 27. 
183. The use of the amended subpoena, and the failure to notify Lilly of that 
subpoena, properly doomed that argument. But had Egilman and Gottstein waited 
for the date on the original subpoena to produce the documents, there still could 
have been an open question about whether sufficient notice was given. 
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reasonable number of days for challenges to subpoenas seems like an 
obvious and low-cost reform. 
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, violation of the 
protective order needs to have significant penalties to deter future 
violations.1 84 Such penalties should be applicable to all parties and 
all violations. Thus, if a defendant consistently mis-designates 
documents in bad faith, sanctions should be explicitly contemplated 
in the protective order and ordered by the court, with a reasonable 
opportunity for the producing party to de-designate documents.' 
85 
Similarly, when a signatory to a protective order violates it by 
distributing protected documents without following the order's 
terms, severe sanctions are appropriate. Because the harm from the 
release cannot be effectively mitigated given the state of technology, 
the courts need to make serious efforts to prevent the release in the 
first place. Both scenarios (mis-designation and leaks) are made 
more likely for the reasons described above, which is why more 
significant attention is needed.
1 86 
184. Indeed, Dr. Egilman's settlement and payment of $100,000 may have 
itself deterred another leaker. A New Jersey journalist who covers the 
pharmaceutical industry told me in an e-mail that he had heard, by way of an 
intermediary, about a litigation expert who was considering leaking documents in 
another mass tort litigation, but was waiting to see what happened to Egilman. As 
of this writing, he has not heard anything more from that potential source. E-mail 
from Edward Silverman, Journalist, New Jersey Star Ledger, to author (Sept. 10, 
2007) (on file with author). 
185. "Bad faith" is not a terribly precise term, but it is a term that courts use 
regularly. Indeed, it is commonly already required in evaluating claims for 
sanctions. See In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (discussing order relating to Cooper Tire document disclosure). Trivial-
even if frequent-mis-designations (e.g., designating newspaper articles as 
confidential) should not trigger any bad faith findings. Instead, the focus should 
be on those mis-designations that appear to be directed solely at avoiding public 
knowledge of information that is not properly confidential. As noted in the text, 
the protective order should give the designating party an opportunity to de-
designate documents prior to any sanctions proceedings taking place, and, unless 
other evidence suggests intentional misconduct, de-designation should eliminate 
the need for sanctions. 
I am not oblivious to the costs that are incurred in the designation process, and 
the risks of over-designation are likely smaller than those of under-designation. 
That said, the concerns that important information might remain secret for no good 
reason are legitimate. This approach-in particular given the opportunity to de-
designate documents-seems reasonable given these concerns. 
186. Judge Weinstein, in correspondence, writes, "Generally I am opposed 
to sanctions, which lead to collateral litigation and ill-will among those who 
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In any such case, with an appropriate showing, courts should 
be open to sanctioning not just the individuals in question (whether 
experts or clients), but also counsel. If it is shown that an attorney 
was either involved with or knowingly permitted such a violation to 
occur, the attorney should be sanctioned accordingly. Clients and 
experts are frequently one-time players, and their sanction (and even 
their removal from the litigation) may be a price that an attorney 
would consider acceptable in order to achieve a higher overall value. 
Including the possibility of individual sanctions may change that 
calculus. Given the fact that such conduct is facilitating the violation 
of a court order, this should not be a particularly controversial 
idea. 187 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To return to a theme established above, various electronic 
communication technologies-whether as mundane as e-mail or as 
complex as the Tor network of document distribution-have 
changed many of the assumptions inherent in modern protective 
order practice. These technologies have made violations of 
protective orders (some innocent and some intentional) more likely, 
and have made the impact of those violations impossible to contain. 
In order to further the goals established by the creation of umbrella 
protective orders in the first place, courts need to make certain 
changes in those orders' scope. When the bell cannot be unrung, it is 
far more important to prevent its improper ringing in the first place. 
So doing will at once help prevent the improper release of 
should be working together to reduce litigation tension, and which seldom have a 
deterrent effect. The Rule 11 fiasco is illustrative." Letter from Judge Jack 
Weinstein to author (Nov. 29, 2007) (on file with author). I share Judge 
Weinstein's general reluctance to use sanctions frequently, but I emphasize that 
my proposal focuses primarily on experts-people as to whom sanctions 
(particularly if expressly contemplated within the protective order endorsement) 
may well be effective. 
187. It is worth noting that the evidence in the Zyprexa litigation does not 
suggest that any of the attorneys involved in the products liability litigation were 
aware of the efforts to avoid the protective order. Indeed, the lawyers from the 
Lanier firm evidently immediately terminated the retention of Dr. Egilman and 
cooperated in discovery in connection with the document leak. Transcript of 
Hearing Before Hon. Jack Weinstein, supranote 81, at 200. 
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confidential documents and create a clearer path to the release of 
important non-confidential documents that can impact public health. 
